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1959 JULY 4, 1959
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FROM: BERLIN
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 23, JULY 4, 1 AM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 23, BONN 22, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON PARIS
MOSCOW UNNUMBERED, POLAD USAREUR UNNUMBERED.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY, USRO, CINCEUR THURSTON AND WEST

A. CURRENT VIEWS WEST BERLIN POLITICAL LEADERS

AFTER GUBBUB CAUSED BY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BERLIN POLITICAL
LEADERS REFOCUSING THEIR THINKING ON GENEVA. CONFERENCE
RECESS HAS DONE LITTLE TO REMOVE THEIR DISTASTE FOR SOME
OF POINTS IN ALLIED PROPOSALS SUBMITTED SHORTLY BEFORE CONFERENCE
ADJOURNED. MAYOR BRANDT TOLD MISSION OFFICERS HIS JUNE 25
FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT (OURTEL 1168 TO DEPT, 1047 TO BONN)
WAS DESIGNED TO UNDERLINE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF WEST'S BERLIN
PROPOSALS AND TO MINIMIZE WHAT HE CONSIDERS ITS INHERENT
DANGERS, I.E. WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER CURBING ACTIVITIES
ALLEGEDLY VIOLATING PUBLIC ORDER AND POSSIBILITY WESTERN
COMMITMENT RE REDUCING GARRISONS. HOWEVER, GENERAL FEELING
OF POLITICAL LEADERS IS THAT THOUGH BRANDT TERMED WESTERN
PROPOSALS AS GOING TO LIMIT OF WHAT IS TOLERABLE, WEST IN
EFFECT WENT BEYOND THAT LIMIT AND OFFERED CONCESSIONS TOO
EARLY IN GAME.

THERE IS ALSO CONCERN OVER STALEMATE ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION
AND FEAR THAT BERLIN WILL BECOME SOLE FOCUS OF FOMIN CONF
WHEN IT RECONVENES. WHILE BUSINESS LEADERS AND BERLIN COMMUNI
IN GENERAL SEEM TO FEEL THAT REACHING MODUS VIVENDI ON BERLIN
MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN FRUITLESS DISCUSSIONS OF GERMAN
REUNIFICATION, POLITICAL LEADERS SEEM TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS
ON INSEPARABILITY OF BERLIN AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND
NEVER TIRE OF POINTING OUT MINIMUM THAT MUST BE ACHIEVED
IS INTERIM BERLIN SOLUTION LASTING UNTIL REUNIFICATION,

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WHICH IS EUPHEMISM FOR SAYING BERLIN ACCESS MUST BE KEPT FREE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

ANOTHER ELEMENT OF CONCERN IS DISUNITY IN EASTERN CAMP, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING DESIRABILITY OF SUMMIT MEETING. CONVICTION IS UNDIMINISHED THAT US IS POWER WHICH ULTIMATELY HOLDS FATE OF BERLIN IN ITS HANDS. PUBLIC CONTROVERSY ON SEVERAL ISSUE BETWEEN BERLIN AND BONN AND BONN'S APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS CONSULT BERLIN REPRESENTATIVES IN MATTERS AFFECTING FUTURE OF CITY, HAS CONFIRMED BELIEF THAT FEDREP CANNOT BE FULLY TRUSTED TO UPHOLD BERLIN'S INTEREST. BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS KNOWN TO BE UNDER DOMESTIC PRESSURE FOR SUMMIT MEETING AT ANY PRICE; WHEREAS THIS ATTITUDE IS NOT APPROVED, MANY BERLIN LEADERS PROFESS UNDERSTANDING FOR BRITISH UNWILLINGNESS RISK MAJOR CRISIS FOR GERMANY'S CAPITAL ONLY 15 YEARS AFTER END OF WAR BROUGHT ABOUT BY GERMANY. FRENCH VOCAL FIRMNESS ON BERLIN IS HIGHLY APPRECIATED BUT EVERYBODY FEELS IT LACKS MEANING IN VIEW FRANCE'S MILITARY WEAKNESS AND FRENCH OPPOSITION WITHIN NATO WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO WEAKENING OF ALLIANCE AND THEREFORE OF WESTERN POSTURE VIS-A-VIS SOVS.

WITHIN PAST WEEK THERE HAS BEEN NOTICEABLE UNEASINESS AMONG BERLIN POLITICAL LEADERS (SENATOR LIPSCHITZ HAS BEEN MOST OUTSPOKEN ON THIS POINT TO MISSION OFFICERS, OTHERS HAVE ALLUDED TO IT) ABOUT INCIPIENT "BERLIN FATIGUE" IN US. BASING CONCERN ON THEIR READING OF THE AMERICAN PRESS AS WELL AS ON COMMUNICATIONS FROM PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE US, THESE LEADERS PRIVATELY EXPRESS FEAR THAT US PUBLIC MAY GROW TIRED OF INTERMINABLE WRANGLING OVER BERLIN. US GOV, IT IS FEARED, MAY THEREFORE FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT CONVINCE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT IT WORTH TAKING STRONG STAND ON BERLIN, ESPECIALLY IF AMERICANS COME TO REGARD BERLIN AS ONLY ISSUE EMBITTERING US-SOV RELATIONS WHICH OTHERWISE MIGHT TAKE TURN FOR BETTER. IN THIS CONNECTION SENATOR SYMINGTON'S STATEMENT THAT HE DOUBTS WHETHER GERMANS WANT US TO RESORT TO ATOMIC WAR OVER BERLIN HAS HAD WORRISOME EFFECT BECAUSE IT WAS FELT THAT SYMINGTON ASCRIBED TO THE GERMANS, ALBEIT POSSIBLY QUITE TRUTHFULLY, AN ATTITUDE HELD BY THE AMERICANS.

RE FURTHER CONFERENCE TACTICS, BERLIN POLITICAL LEADERS ALMOST

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UNANIMOUSLY ECHO BRANDT'S VIEW THAT CONFERENCE MUST GET AWAY FROM ISOLATED TREATMENT BERLIN ISSUE AND CONCENTRATE ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. WHILE NOBODY OPTIMISTIC REUNIFICATION, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BELIEF THAT EAST-WEST ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THAT WITHIN ITS CONTEXT BERLIN ISSUE MIGHT BE KEPT ON ICE FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE.

THOUGHT IS ALSO SOMETIMES EXPRESSED THAT WESTERN POWERS HAVE NEGLECTED DEVICE OF BRINGING DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES ON SOVS, E.G., BY THREATENING THEM WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, POSSIBLE DENIAL OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, OR BY FORCEFULLY POINTING OUT TO THEM THAT SHOOTING INCIDENT (NOT NECESSARILY WAR) OVER BERLIN MIGHT TOUCH OFF ANTI-SOV UPRISINGS IN EAST GERMANY AND POLAND.

SOME BERLIN LEADERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT WEST HAS DEALT TOO GENTLEMANLY WITH SOVS AND SHOULD EMBARK ON SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN DRAWING PARALLEL BETWEEN SOV AND NAZISTACTICS, EMPHASIZING HOW HITLER'S MISCALCULATION IN 1939 OF ANGLO-FRENCH RESOLVE HAD BROUGHT ABOUT WORLD WAR II. IT IS ARGUED THAT NOT ONLY ARE SOVS EXCEEDINGLY SENSITIVE TO COMPARISON WITH NAZIS, BUT SUCH TACTCS WOULD ALSO HAVE GOOD EFFECT ON ATTITUDE OF UNCOMMITTED NATIONS.

FINALLY, THOUGHT IS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED THAT BREAKUP FONMIN CONFERENCE IS PREFERABLE TO SEMANTIC PAPERING OVER OF EAST-WEST IMPASSE THROUGH USUAL COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE. BERLIN LEADERS CONVINCED THAT POPULATION WOULD FIND HARSHIPS, UNCERTAINTIES AND DIRECT THREATS (WHICH LEADERS CERTAIN WOULD BE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED) PREFERABLE TO DEVELOPMENT OF A SITUATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO GRADUAL ABOLITION BASIC FREEDOMS WEST BERLIN.

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FROM: BERLIN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 23, JULY 4, 1 AM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 23, BONN 22, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON,
PARIS, MOSCOW, UNNUMBERED, POLAD USAREUR UNNUMBERED.

PARIS FOR EMBASSY USRO CINCEUR THURSTON AND WEST.

BRANDT'S SUGGESTION FOR "INTER-ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION"
(OURTEL 1168 TO DEPT., 1047 TO BONN) DESIGNED TO BRING ALL
EAST-WEST TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING BERLIN ACCESS,
UNDER JURISDICTION OF ONE INSTITUTION REPRESENTS CONCERTED
THINKING OF HIS ADVISORS. VERY FEW ADDITIONAL IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS
ARE ENCOUNTERED. THOUGHT WAS EXPRESSED TO MISSION OFFICER
BY BRANDT THAT IN SUCH EAST-WEST GERMAN INSTITUTION, TECHNICAL
EXPERTS, USING TECHNICAL LANGUAGE WHICH (AS OPPOSED TO "POLITICAL"
LANGUAGE) STILL HAS SAME MEANING BOTH EAST AND WEST,
MIGHT ARRIVE AT SATISFACTORY TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS
MIGHT HAPPEN PARTICULARLY IF ECONOMICALLY WEALTHY FEDREP
EXPRESSES MORE OR LESS OPENLY ITS WILLINGNESS TO BUY OFF
GDR WITH MONTHLY OR ANNUAL LUMP SUM FOR ALL EAST GERMAN
SERVICES RENDERED, INCLUDING AUTOBAHN AND CANAL TOLLS
(PRESUMABLY IN AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF WHAT THEY PAY IN TOTAL
NOW). IT ALSO BELIEVED THAT SUCH COMMISSION COULD ON SPECIAL
INSTRUCTION OF FOUR POWERS DEAL WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS
WITHOUT RAISING QUESTION OR RECOGNITION.

B. MOOD OF WEST BERLIN POPULACE

MOOD OF BERLIN POPULATION DURING GENEVA RECESS PROBABLY BEST
CHARACTERIZED AS ONE OF CALM "WAITING FOR NOTHING", AS ONE
BERLINER EXPRESSED IT. TO EXTENT THAT GENERAL PUBLIC HAS NOT
ALLOWED ITS INTERESTS TO BE ABSORBED IN NATIONAL FOOTBALL
CHAMPIONSHIP AND FILM FESTIVAL WHICH TAKING PLACE IN NORMAL
ATMOSPHERE OF CONVIVIALITY, BERLINERS EXPRESS OPINION THAT

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SERIES OF EAST-WEST TALKS WITH NO PROSPECT FOR EASY AGREEMENT LIES AHEAD.

CONFIDENCE CONTINUES HIGH THAT ALLIES HAVE NO INTENTION OF ABANDONING BERLIN, BUT POPULATION GREETS AND CONTINUES TO SEEK FURTHER MANIFESTATIONS ALL IN SFLVPOIT# FOR BERLIN. THUS CONVOCATION OF FEDERAL ASSEMBLY IN WEST BERLIN HAD SALUTORY EFFECT; SUGGESTION HAS BEEN HEARD OCCASIONALLY THAT WESTERN HEADS OF GOV OR FOMINS SHOULD MEET DURING RECESS IN WEST BERLIN.

REGARDING OUTCOME FIRST SIX WEEKS AT GENEVA, MAJORITY GENERAL PUBLIC, HAVING FROM BEGINNING HELD LITTLE HOPE FOR SUCCESS, IS NOT DISAPPOINTED AT LACK OF RESULTS. FACT THAT CONFERENCE NOT BROKEN OFF IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS POSITIVE ELEMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE, HOWEVER, MINORITY WHO ARE DISAPPOINTED, HAVING ENTERTAINED HOPE AGAINST HOPE THAT SOME RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED. EVEN AMONG SOME OF THOSE WHO CLAIM THE OPPOSITE, UNDERLYING DISAPPOINTMENT CAN BE DETECTED.

REGARDING FUTURE, LESS INFORMED ELEMENTS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE WORRIED ABOUT EVENTUAL OUTCOME; ALTHOUGH REALIZING THAT GENEVA HAS SHOWN CLEARLY THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS BUDGED, THEY SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT SOMEHOW BERLIN IMPASSE WILL BE RESOLVED. FINER DETAILS OF NEGOTIATIONS ESCAPE GENERAL POPULACE WHO FIRMLY BELIEVE WEST MEANS TO STAY IN BERLIN, HOWEVER THAT IS ACCOMPLISHED.

POLITICALLY MORE ASTUTE ELEMENTS HOWEVER, SEE THEIR ORIGINAL PESSIMISM CONFIRMED BY GENEVA DEADLOCK AND WORRY THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS OFFERED BEFORE RECESS WILL NOT TERMINATE EAST-WEST IMPASSE AND MAY EVEN ENCOURAGE SOVS TO PURSUE HARD COURSE.

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